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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR PARTICIPATION  IN THE WTO IN 
MAKING TRADE POLICY – AN ANALYSIS 
 
Ravinder Rena∗
Abstract 
Trade and investment are of paramount importance to achieve sustainable development 
thereby eradicating poverty. Developing countries were strongly arguing on this issue. 
Their argument emanates from the fact that the terms of trade between the developing 
and developed countries are unfair. All the developing countries realized that they 
needed the WTO to negotiate export market access particularly in highly protected 
sectors like agriculture and textiles, and to defend themselves against non-tariff 
protection from developed countries.  The developing countries constitute for a four-fifths 
in the WTO, only a small minority are active in it. Weak participation in the WTO is 
largely a reflection and extension of policy-making deficits at home. In line with this they 
are participating in WTO and redesigning their trade policies in enhancing the domestic 
trade and contribute for the global trade. This article explores the GATT/WTO policies 
and their impact on the trade and development of developing countries. It also highlights 
the general arrangements/preferences available to developing countries by EU and other 
developed world and it provides good trade policy with specific objectives and indicators 
that are important for the developing countries. 
 
Keywords: Developing countries, WTO, GATT, Trade Policy Doha Conference, 
Tariff.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Trade and investment are of paramount importance to achieve sustainable development 
thereby eradicating poverty. As is well known, the South-East Asia countries commonly 
referred to us as the Asian tigers have reached a high level of economic growth through 
international trade. World Trade Organization formerly known as GATT is promoting the 
international trade. The developing countries (majority) constitute four-fifths in the 
WTO, only a small minority are active in it; most of the rest – an absolute majority of 
WTO membership – seem incapable of effective participation. Weak participation in the 
WTO is largely a reflection and extension of policy-making deficits at home. Most 
developing countries suffer from poor leadership, misguided policies and basic 
institutional defects. Related to this, although insufficiently appreciated, is their lack of 
logistical wherewithal – the administrative capacity and expertise --to deliver and sustain 
sound, credible trade policies (UNCTAD, 1999; Dubey, 1996).  
 
While trade is an important way for developing countries to improve their living 
standards and lift people out of poverty, other factors are also important. More and more 
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studies are showing that government policies, which support investment in basic health, 
education and infrastructure, are essential for good development prospects. Where a 
country’s institutions of governance are weak or corrupt, protecting local industries won’t 
help matters, because any ‘gains’ from protection are wasted. 
 
Agriculture, the foundation of food and national security, was redefined as an issue of 
trade and commerce alone during the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) with agribusiness Multi -national Companies (MNCs) as the 
determining force in the shift. Agriculture is long been considered as a backbone in most 
of the developing countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) indeed does not refer to food and agriculture at all. There is no 
reference in it to soil or crops, to food or farmers, to sustainability or livelihoods, to food 
security or fair prices. Core issues of agriculture and food security at the national level 
have been reduced to non-issues in the global agreement. Food security, rural 
development, environmental sustainability, survival and sustenance of small farmers have 
been lumped together as “non-trade” issues are redefined as barriers to trade. In the AoA, 
trade and commerce come first — in other words, corporate profits take priority over the 
health of the planet or people (Dubey, 1996). That is why the relentless implementation 
of the WTO's trade liberalization rules is pushing Global farmers to the poverty, hunger 
and the planet towards an ecological catastrophe in the form of climate disasters, 
extinction of species and destruction of water systems.  
 
Further, trade, market, and agricultural subsidies have been amongst the most 
controversial issue debated in World trade Organization (WTO), World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD), G8 Summit and so on. Developing countries were 
strongly arguing on this issue. Their argument emanates from the fact that they believe 
the term of trade between the developing and developed countries are unfair. Moreover, 
they believe that an end to farm subsidies in rich states would also enable them to export 
more products and earn foreign exchange to help development. Unfair subsidies, 
particularly in agriculture are seen as major trade barriers for the South. However, it is 
said that the recent World Trade Organization's summit in Hong Kong (13-18 December 
2005) with economic leaders from 149 nations have made progress on a far-reaching 
global trade pact. The interim deal end farm export subsidies by 2013 and open up 
markets in wealthier countries to the world's poorest nations. 
 
The main objective of the study is to explore the impact of the WTO policies on the trade 
and development of the majority of the developing nations. Besides, it provides a 
theoretical base in understanding the trade policies of developing countries with regards 
to WTO policies. As part of the study, data were collected from secondary sources. The 
secondary data were collected from various GATT/WTO, World Bank reports, published 
and unpublished research papers and books related to the subject.  
 
This paper is been divided into five sections. Section two deals with the participation of 
developing countries in the WTO and it focus on general arrangements and EU/EC trade 
concessions to ACP and other developing countries. Section three delves how developing 
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countries make their trade policies. Section four explains the objectives and indicators of 
good trade policy and last section provides concluding remarks of the paper. 
 
2. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT/WTO 
Until the launch of the Uruguay Round, nearly all developing countries excluded 
themselves from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT’s) core business: 
export market access was not considered especially important in the context of import-
substitution policies; and Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) meant that 
developing countries were not obliged to open own markets (Panagariya, 2002; Dubey, 
1996). This changed in the 1980s when successive waves of developing countries 
liberalized trade (and foreign direct investment) as part of broader packages of policy 
reform. Trade became central to national growth strategies therefore all the governments 
realized that they needed the GATT to negotiate export market access particularly in 
highly protected sectors like agriculture and textiles, and to defend themselves against 
non-tariff protection from developed countries (UNCTAD, 1999; Mathur, 2002). 
 
In line with this, a small number of developing countries – mostly from Latin America 
and East Asia, plus India - became increasingly active during the Uruguay Round. It is to 
be recalled that, for the first time, a critical mass of them were at the GATT negotiating 
table, bargaining for market access and even involved in key rule-making deliberations. 
The vast majority of developing countries, however, remained passive and reactive 
(Mathur, 2002). 
 
Such divergence between an active minority and an inactive majority has become more 
marked since the founding of the WTO on 1 January 1995. There are just a score or so of 
really active developing countries. Most of them are in the middle-income bracket with 
not insignificant and rising shares of international trade and investment. Most have also 
undertaken radical and sustained unilateral liberalization. They have well-staffed 
missions in Geneva with high-profile ambassadors, many of whom chair important WTO 
committees. They are active in the formal and informal coalitions where much of the deal 
making is done. It is in the compact, issue-based coalitions, often spanning the notional 
developed-developing country divide, where the active developing countries really come 
into their own (Mathur, 2002). Finally, some of them have reasonably well resourced 
trade policy operations back in national capitals. 
 
Next comes a diverse crew of poorer developing countries, some quite large such as 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, whose vocal ambassadors tend to push “development” issues. 
However, their influence in the WTO’s work programme is limited by their serious lack 
of administrative capacity, in Geneva and at home. This leaves a very large group, 
amounting to about half or more of the WTO membership, with weak-to-minimal 
participation. Many of them are least developed countries and small island-states without 
a Geneva mission. Most of the others have perhaps one or two representatives in Geneva 
to cover all the international organizations in town. 
 
The WTO sorely needs stronger developing country participation. Only then can 
developing countries be forceful demanders for their market access priorities, defend 
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themselves against front and backdoor protection from developed and other developing 
countries, and make sure their rights are upheld in dispute settlement.  
It can be viewed that developing countries should have freedom in fixing tariffs in 
agriculture, especially in the face of high Northern subsidies. Trade liberalization cannot 
set the determining framework for how food is produced and how agriculture is 
organized. Countries cannot ignore the issues of economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability. One can find a fault with WTO is that it has externalized these basic issues 
in the AoA (Gulati, and Ketly, 1999).  
 
The second source of the crisis arises from the process itself. The WTO as a system 
excludes and marginalizes the concerns of developing countries. After the failure of the 
Seattle Ministerial Conference, the most frequently used phrase was that the WTO is a 
“member-driven organization”. However, the process since ‘Doha Conference’ shows the 
opposite (Panagariya, 2002). 
 
The excluding nature of the WTO process is made worse by the manner in which Mr. 
Harbinson prepared the draft for negotiation. The issues raised of developing countries 
have been conveniently dropped. The critical issue of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) has 
conveniently been excluded even though it is at the heart of agricultural conflicts. The 
conflict between the U.S. and the E.U. is centred on the Europeans' ban on GMOs. The 
North-South conflict is centred on the high subsidies of $400 billion in OECD countries, 
and the dumping resulting from forced removal of QRs. A recently released report from 
the International Agriculture and Trade Policy Institute has shown that in four major U.S. 
commodities, the level of dumping has increased since 1995 when the WTO came into 
force, even though the WTO's proclaimed aim is to “reduce distortions in trade (WTO, 
2000)”.  
 
Introducing restrictions on imports or raising tariffs in the only safeguard for poor 
peasants and poor countries in the face of the trade-distorting subsidies and dumping 
practiced by rich countries. This is what countries such as India, Argentina, Philippines 
have proposed. Mr. Harbinson's draft completely ignores these proposals to regulate 
imports as a self-defence strategy against dumping. Instead, it proposes removing even 
temporary rights to safeguards “participation should decide whether the special safeguard 
provisions of Article 5 of the AoA should be eliminated”.  
 
What needs elimination is not Article 5 but Article 4.2 on market access which states, 
“members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have 
been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties (these measures include 
quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, 
discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading 
enterprises, voluntary export restraints and similar border measures) except as provided  
in Article 5.”  
 
It is important to note that the entry of China into the WTO has a dramatic impact on the 
country's estimated 800 million farmers. About two-thirds of China's population lives in 
rural areas but agricultural output only makes up 16 per cent of the gross domestic 
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product (GDP) and 4.9 per cent of exports (Satapathy, 2002). It is to be noted that during 
the last three years after WTO entry, the country's farming sector hit the hardest. The 
Chinese Government formally disclosed the detailed rules on new tariff quotas for 
agricultural imports, which follows the commitment made by Beijing to the WTO. The 
Chinese Government has reduced the average import duty to 17.5 per cent by 2004 and to 
15.6 per cent by 2005 from the average of 21.3 per cent before 2003. China has pledged 
to use a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system, instead of the original quota administration 
system, for certain sensitive products such as wheat, corn, rice, edible oil and sugar, as 
well as to cancel export subsidies, keep its subsidy rate for farming at 8.5 per cent and 
abide by the WTO agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitory Measures (SPS). 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) report on trends in trade in 2005 and prospects in 
2006 highlights the weak spots in terms of economic growth. According to WTO 
economists, growth in global trade has, in the past decade, been consistently double the 
growth in the global economy. This is apparently reflective of the fact that in an 
increasingly open tariff regime, goods tend to be produced and traded on the basis of 
comparative advantage. Global merchandise trade growth in 2005, at six per cent, was 
substantially lower than the growth of nine per cent in 2004. The WTO's prognosis for 
2006 is a slightly higher trade growth at seven per cent in 2006, but this is subject to 
many uncertainties that could undermine the upside potential. The report shows that the 
weakest spot in global economic — and hence trade — growth currently is Europe, 
where developed nations such as France, Italy, Germany, and the U.K. recorded 
economic growth ranging from near zero per cent to less than two per cent and where 
high unemployment and low levels of growth in consumption marked the domestic 
scenario. In contrast, economic growth was the highest in China and India, followed by 
many other developing countries (WTO Report, 2006). 
 
2.1. General Arrangements  
The preferences under general arrangements are available to all developing countries 
including China, which has chosen not to join the Group of 77, as also the transition 
economies. Of the total of 10,300 products, 2,100 products face zero duties in EU. Of the 
remaining 8,200 products, approximately 7,000 are subject to preferences under general 
arrangements(WTO, 2000). Typically, agricultural products are left out of the list of products 
subject to tariff preferences.  Of these, 3,300 are classified as non-sensitive and 3,700 as 
sensitive. Under the general arrangements, EU grants duty free access on non-sensitive 
products and partial tariff preferences on sensitive products. Sensitive products are 
defined as those requiring higher border protection. This definition automatically rules 
out duty free access in products with high tariff duties (Bhagwati, et al, 1998:1130-1). 
Given that high duties typically apply to products such as textiles and apparel and 
footwear in which developing countries have a comparative advantage, this rule 
introduces a negative correlation between the margin of preferences and the ability of 
developing countries to export.  
 
As a rule, a flat preference of 3.5 percentage points is provided on sensitive products. For 
a product with 14 percent duty, this amounts to a 25 percent preference margin. A major 
exception to the rule is textiles and clothing for which the flat-preference rule is replaced 
by a 20 percent preference margin. On a product with 14 percent duty, this makes the 
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preference 2.8 percentage points, which is often insufficient for exporters to make it 
attractive for exporters to put together the paper work.  
 
Based on certain criteria, a country may be excluded from GSP altogether or graduated 
from specific products. Two criteria are applied for complete exclusion. First, the World 
Bank classifies the country as a high-income country for three consecutive years. Second, 
a development index, which measures a country’s industrial development and 
participation in international trade relative to EU, attains a pre-specified value. Both 
criteria must be satisfied (Panagariya, 2002: 1210).  
 
Sometimes, even if a country is not excluded from GSP entirely, it can be graduated from 
GSP privileges in specific sectors. The graduation is based on achieving a certain degree 
of competitiveness in the sector. Graduation may take place under one of the two 
mechanisms: a lion’s share clause and a graduation mechanism. The former applies if the 
EU imports of a product from a beneficiary country reach 25 percent of the combined 
imports from all beneficiary countries. The graduation mechanism, on the other hand, is 
based on the degree of specialization of the beneficiary country. I sector graduates if it 
reaches a certain threshold. In turn, the threshold is higher the lower the level of 
development.  
 
2.3. EU and ACP Preferences of Trade 
Africa’s share of world trade is a mere 2%. More specifically, Africa’s share in world 
trade has been falling since 1980, from about 6.0% of world total exports in 1980 to 2.0% 
in 2002, and from 4.6% of world total imports in 1980 to 2.1% in 2002 (UNCTAD, 
2004). Besides, the prevailing intra-Africa trade is very low. Therefore, Africa should 
first focus on removing intra-Africa trade barriers. Africa must intensify its regional 
integration processes so as to build and consolidate supply capacity before rushing to a 
global trade. For instance integrating economies under the COMESA regime alone 
provide a market of more than 380 million people.  
 
Therefore, it became imperative that seventy-one countries, spread over Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) regions, receive one-way trade preferences from European 
Community under the Lomé Convention(Zden, and Reinhardt, 2005: 3-6). The 
beneficiaries include forty-seven countries from south Saharan Africa, sixteen island 
nations of the Caribbean, and eight islands from the Pacific. Thirty-nine of the ACP 
countries are classified as the least developed countries by the United Nations (World 
Bank, 2001).  
 
The origins of the EU-ACP cooperation can be traced back to the Treaty Of Rome signed 
in 1957, which expressed commitment to contribute to the prosperity of the colonies and 
overseas countries with historical ties with the EC member states and proposed the 
creation of the European Development Fund (EDF) for this purpose. Subsequently, this 
provision culminated in the Yaounde I (1963-69) and Yaounde II (1969-75) agreements 
between EC and ACP countries under which bulk of the EDF funds were pledged to 
French-speaking Africa to build infrastructure.  
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Accession of the United Kingdom to EC in 1973 led to the signing of a more far reaching 
agreement, Lomé I (1975-80), between 46 ACP and the EC member states. The 
agreement introduced trade preferences for most ACP exports to EC markets. 
Additionally, the UK desire to bring its special trade preferences for bananas and sugar 
under the EC umbrella resulted in separate trading 'protocols' on sugar, bananas, and beef 
and veal. The trade preferences and the protocols became integral parts of the successive 
Lomé Conventions, Lomé II (1980-85), Lomé III (1985-90) and Lomé IV (1990-2000).  
 
The banana protocol gives duty-free entry for specific quotas of bananas into the EU 
market. Several small island Caribbean states have been among the main beneficiaries of 
the quotas. Under the sugar protocol, EC annually buys a fixed quantity of sugar from 
ACP producers at its internal sugar price. Among the major beneficiaries of this 
arrangement are Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Barbados. Under the beef and veal protocol, 
EC refunds 90 per cent of tax normally paid on beef imports from several ACP countries. 
This has been especially beneficial to Southern African exporters.  
 
Trade preferences in the Lomé Convention cover 99 percent of the industrial products of 
ACP countries without quantitative limits. This is superior to the preferences under GSP 
described below. In the case of 39 least developed countries, the recent “Everything but 
Arms” initiative (see below) supersedes the ACP preferences, however. The agreement 
also consists of a major aid component through the EDB, which allocates funds 
amounting to ε4 to 6 billion every five-year period (Zden, and Reinhardt, 2005). 
 
The scope of the Lomé Convention is a far wider than trade preferences and aid. Lomé 
IV especially widened the agenda of the agreement, introducing even human rights as an 
‘essential element’ of cooperation, meaning that any violations could lead to a partial or 
total suspension of aid by EU. It also introduced environmental considerations through a 
‘protocol’ that allowed the tapping of the eighth EDF budget (1995-2000) fro the 
preservation of rainforests in the ACP member countries (WTO, 2000).  
 
With Lomé IV having expired, the Cotonou Agreement has recently replaced it. This is a 
20-year agreement, resting on five pillars: a comprehensive political dimension, 
participatory approaches, a strengthened focus on poverty reduction, a new framework 
for economic and trade cooperation and a reform of financial cooperation. Some of the 
detailed provisions illustrate further the wide reach of the agreement: respect for human 
rights and democratic principles; a new specific procedure to be launched in serious cases 
of corruption; consultation of civil society on the economic, social and institutional 
reforms and policies to be supported by EC; an integrated approach to poverty reduction 
centered on economic development, social and human development and regional 
cooperation and integration; a process to establish new trading arrangements that will 
pursue trade liberalization between the parties; cooperation in trade related areas such as 
competition policy, intellectual property, trade and environment and trade and labor; and 
the channeling of EDF funds through two instruments—one envelope for providing 
grants and one for providing risk capital and loans to the private sector.  
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Under the agreement, trade relations between EU and ACP partners are to undergo a 
major overhaul. During 2000-07, which is regarded as the preparatory period, the current 
regime with its preferences and the protocols on sugar, banana, and beef and veal are to 
be maintained in some modified form. In parallel, countries other than the least 
developed countries are to negotiate economic cooperation agreements including a GATT 
Article XXIV compatible bilateral free trade area with EU. This means that the current 
one-way trade preferences by EU will be replaced by reciprocal preferences more or less 
as in the case of the Mediterranean partners. The new arrangements are to enter into force 
latest by January 1, 2008 with transition to a full FTA spread over at least 12 years. 
 
3. TRADE POLICY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
Unfortunately, the thinking on trade policy capacity-building in developing countries is 
conceived in Olympian, “top-down” terms. “Global governance,” involving a never-
ending list of donors and international organizations, is the order of the day. This misses 
the point: the simple truth is that good trade policy, like charity, begins at home, not in 
the IMF and World Bank, nor indeed in the WTO. Trade policy capacity has to be rooted 
in the subsoil of nation-states and nurtured “bottom-up.” Only on this terra firma can 
countries participate effectively in the WTO ((Panagariya, 2002: 1217; Satapathy, 2002). 
The latter, in turn, can be a helpful auxiliary, an external constitutional prop, to good 
national governance, especially by buttressing the rule-framework for the protection of 
private property rights and the enforcement of contracts in international transactions, 
thereby providing a more stable and predictable business environment. In other words, 
the WTO is at best a complement, not a substitute, for what is in essence a national task 
(Dubey, 1996). 
 
Two basic propositions follow from this constitutional train of thought: 1] Developing 
countries with reasonably well functioning trade policy management and credible trade 
policies at home participate actively in the WTO and benefit from its rules and 
obligations; 2] The vast majority of developing countries lack these domestic 
foundations; rather, in the absence of leadership and capacity at home, donors and 
international organizations often drive trade policies externally (Gulati, and Ketly, 1999). 
Consequently, these countries are weak in the WTO; they are reactive and muddle 
through. This enables powerful developed countries to bully them in negotiations, as 
happened especially in the latter stages of the Uruguay Round. These are precisely the 
countries that have not benefited from the WTO system to date (Panagariya, 2002). 
 
4. OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS OF GOOD TRADE POLICY  
Credible and sustainable trade policy outcomes require an efficient delivery mechanism, 
i.e. good trade policy decision making. The main objectives of good trade policy 
management are threefold: 1] Clear, precise definition of national interests in policy 
formulation, with a strong sense of how trade policy fits into the overall national 
economic strategy; 2] Effective negotiating capacity at bilateral, regional and multilateral 
levels, with a good appreciation of the dynamic interaction between these levels; and 3] 
Effective domestic implementation of unilateral measures and international agreements. 
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How are these objectives to be achieved? What are the indicators of good and bad trade 
policy making? The following checklist breaks down trade policy making into its main 
components. 
 
• General institutional and economic policy issues inasmuch as they impinge upon 
trade policy. 
• The overall structure of government, especially the interactions between the 
executive, legislature, judiciary and political parties on trade policy issue. 
• The role of the lead ministry on trade policy. 
• Co-ordination within government between the lead ministry, other ministries and 
regulatory agencies on trade policy. 
• The input of sub-national actors in trade policy, especially in federal systems. 
• The role of the national mission to the WTO, and co-ordination between it and the 
trade policy machinery back at home. 
• Non-governmental input in trade policy, e.g. from business, NGOs and think-
tanks. 
• The role of donors and international organizations. 
• Transparency issues, e.g. the level of public knowledge and debate on national 
trade policy choices. 
 
Most developing countries fare badly on all these counts. No trade policy works in a 
climate of macroeconomic instability, made worse by rampant corruption and weak 
enforcement of property rights and contracts. Most lead ministries on trade policy are not 
high up the pecking order within government and tend to be captured by politically well-
connected protectionist forces (Dubey, 1996; Rena, 2006). Inter-agency co-ordination is 
usually bad on traditional trade policy issues like tariffs and quotas on merchandise, and 
abysmal on newer issues like services, intellectual property and environmental standards, 
which involve regulatory agencies across the range of government. Most WTO missions 
are under-resourced and do not co-ordinate well with ministries back at home. Apart from 
habitual rent-seeking, business and other non-governmental input in trade policy is hardly 
evident. Finally, trade policy lacks transparency: almost everywhere it is dominated by 
well-organized insiders within government and outside it; intelligent public discussion on 
crucial trade policy choices, informed by independent, economically literate analysis, is 
conspicuous by its absence. No wonder most developing countries are unable to 
formulate clear and precise national interests in trade policy, lack negotiating capacity in 
international forums, and fail to implement international agreements in timely and 
effective fashion. There are examples of good practice in trade policy management across 
the developing world, which translates into reasonably sound and stable trade policies at 
home as well as effective participation in the WTO (Gulati, and Ketly, 1999).  Let us turn 
to a few of these examples. 
 
4.1. Lead ministries:  
Trade policy responsibility is usually housed in trade-and-industry  ministries. However, 
foreign ministries take the lead in some countries. Brazil, Chile and Mauritius, all noted 
for effective and high profile trade policy operations, are cases in point as are Australia 
and New Zealand in the OECD, and Estonia in Eastern Europe (WTO, 2000).  
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Investing trade policy competence in foreign ministries may have certain advantages. 
Foreign ministries tend to have some of the brightest and the best officials within national 
administrations; they are often led by powerful ministers; they may be less liable to 
interest group capture than commerce ministries; and, compared with sometimes 
parochial commerce ministries, they are better able to put trade policy into the larger 
foreign policy picture. On the other hand, foreign ministries often lack depth in terms of 
economic analysis and may sacrifice economically informed trade policy priorities to 
other foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, there are examples of successful trade policy 
leadership by capable trade-and industry ministries. Hong Kong and Singapore are 
among the best examples.  
 
4.2. Inter-agency co-ordination: 
 Co-ordination among diverse ministries and regulatory agencies is increasingly 
important as trade policy becomes more entangled with non-border regulatory issues. 
However, it rarely works well, in part because non-trade ministries and regulators do not 
have trade policy high up their lists of priorities. Large, populace countries like China and 
India have a particular problem with inter-agency co-ordination, all the more so when 
they have complex federal systems. Small countries with relatively slim line, compact 
administrations tend to do a better job with inter-agency co-ordination. The trade-and-
industry ministries in Hong Kong and Singapore, for example, co-ordinate closely with 
other parts of government, especially on services issues since services being at the heart 
of trade policy in both global cities. It is to be noted that several Latin American 
countries, Hong Kong, Singapore, Hungary and Mauritius have well-staffed missions 
with talented officials and capable, influential heads of mission. The key to a mission’s 
success is effective two-way communication with the lead ministry at home.  
 
4.3. Non-governmental input: 
 Even with the active developing country participants in the WTO, business and other 
non-governmental input in trade policy has been lacking, although it is gradually 
improving. Policy makers and negotiators need qualitative and quantitative market 
intelligence from business, input from NGOs for example, on consumer issues such as 
food safety, and independent research and analysis from universities and think-
tanks(Gulati, and Ketly, 1999; Mathur, 2002). Mauritius has a formal co-ordination 
mechanism with the private sector on trade policy issues; and some Latin American lead 
ministries on trade get increasing feedback from business on agriculture and some 
manufacturing issues. Private sector input on services remains a problem almost 
everywhere. Hong Kong is an exception: it has a very active Coalition of Services 
Industries which liases closely with the Trade Department and the WTO mission. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper discussed the EC/EU trade relations with developing countries. The focus has 
been on preferential trade intended to promote closer ties with these countries. In the 
process, the EC integration schemes have been multi-layered such that developing 
countries may have suffered discrimination despite the special schemes in their favor 
because the special schemes offered others are sweeter. As EU forges closer and closer 
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ties with its European partners, developing countries are bound to suffer from trade 
diversion. In the face of rising subsidies and increasing dumping, import restrictions and 
countervailing duties are a right, a survival necessity. The critics believed that WTO has 
robbed countries of this right through Article 4 and now, would like to rob them even of 
temporary safeguards by proposing to eliminate Article 5. Some developing countries, 
particularly the Mediterranean and ACP countries, may be compensated through 
preferences for themselves but that will then necessarily come at the expense of other 
developing countries in Asia and Africa. Fruit producers in South Africa for example, 
protested that Agoa did not induce them to expand production, since the necessary 
investments were too risky given that the benefits granted by Agoa can be revoked at any 
time. Producers in Africa can expect that any time they succeed in taking true advantage 
of Agoa, some special interest group in the US will demand that the benefits be 
rescinded. 
 
The preferential trade practices discussed principally in the context of the EU schemes, 
all such schemes and therefore pose greater threat to the interests of developing countries. 
Therefore, it is more important than ever to successfully complete the Doha round of 
negotiations, bringing trade barriers down in developed and developing countries on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. Such liberalization will not only promote genuine free trade but 
also remove the uncertainty associated with one-way trade preferences, reduce the 
existing discrimination across countries and help clean up the spaghetti-bowl 
phenomenon that now characterizes the trading system.  
 
Clearly, there is much trade policy capacity building to do in the developing world. There 
are examples of better trade policy practice across developing countries. Given lower 
levels of development and more scarce political and administrative resources, developing 
countries probably have more to learn about good practice from each other, and from 
advanced emerging markets like Hong Kong and Singapore, than they can learn from 
long-established developed countries in North America and the European Union. 
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